NOTE
SOCIAL SCIENCE FINDINGS AND THE
JURY'S ABILITY TO DISREGARD
EVIDENCE UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
I
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for the exclusion of certain types of
evidence from presentation at trial in a variety of situations. Evidence may be
held inadmissible because of irrelevance, ' prejudicial, misleading, or dilatory
effect that substantially outweighs probative value, 2 or classification in one of
several explicit categories of inadmissibility. 3 Evidence held to be hearsay is
5
generally inadmissible 4 as is evidence held to be privileged.
When a question of admissibility arises before evidence has been
presented, a judge is free to rule on the issue before or during the trial6 and
may declare a hearing on the issue to be open or closed to the jury, at his
discretion. 7 A motion for such a ruling in advance of the presentation of
evidence is a motion in limine, and its use has been encouraged by courts and
scholars for its potential to limit thejury's exposure to inadmissible evidence. 8
There are, however, occasions when inadmissible evidence will find its way
before a jury: A permitted question may elicit an answer based on hearsay; a
witness may blurt out evidence before a party can object; a count of the
complaint may be dropped at trial, rendering previously presented evidence
irrelevant. When such situations arise, the party damaged by the presented
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therewith); Rule 407 (evidence of subsequent remedial measures is generally inadmissible); Rule 408
(evidence of an offer to compromise a claim is generally inadmissible); Rule 409 (evidence of an offer
to pay medical expenses is generally inadmissible); Rule 410 (evidence of certain pleadings are per se
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7. FED. R. EvID. 104(c); see also FED. R. EVID. 103(c) (advising a closed hearing when potentially
prejudicial evidence is involved); FED. R. Civ. P. 43(c) (stating that a court may require a preliminary
offer of evidence to be made out of the hearing of a jury).
8. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 52, at 128 (3d ed. 1984). See also United States v. Oakes, 565
F.2d 170, 173 ( st Cir. 1977); Gamble, The Motion In Limine: A Pretrial Procedure That Has Come of Age,
33 A.A. L, REV. 1 (1981).
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evidence should make a prompt objection 9 and move to strike the evidence.
If the judge grants this motion, he will instruct the jury to disregard the
evidence in question.' 0 When the prejudicial effect of the presented evidence
is so grave that no instruction could reverse its impression upon the jury, the
court may declare a mistrial.
A related problem occurs when evidence is admissible for some purposes
but not others, or as against some defendants but not others." When this
type of evidence is admitted, the court should give the jury a limiting
instruction, describing the scope of the evidence's purpose in the jury's
determinations. 12
The situations described above give rise to important questions
concerning the jury's ability to follow instructions, both to strike and to limit
the use of certain evidence. Policies underlying exclusionary rules may be
masterfully devised and socially valuable, but they become worthless if juries
are unable to follow the instructions that the policies generate. This note will
first describe the views of the courts and of the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence on this aspect of jury competence. It will then
examine specific theories and experiments drawn from research in the social
sciences bearing on the cognitive ability of ajury to disregard evidence, or use
it only for limited purposes. After surveying such theories and experiments,
this note will attempt to demonstrate their practical implications by analyzing
their applicability with respect to a concrete evidentiary issue: the exclusion
of a victim's prior sexual history in rape cases under the "rape shield statute"
(Federal Rule of Evidence 412). This note will conclude by assimilating these
analyses into a discussion of the role of the jury generally.
II
VIEWS FROM THE COURTS AND THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
JURY'S ABILITY TO DISREGARD

The effectiveness of instructions to disregard evidence has historically
been met with skepticism. Even those institutions that would propose and
promote the use of such instructions have expressed some. doubts as to the
jury's ability to follow them. Judge Learned Hand called such instructions
"recommendation[s] to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not

only their powers, but anybody's else,"' 13 and labelled the instructional
procedure
5
present. '

a legal

"placebo."'

4

These criticisms

have endured

to the

9. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1).
10. See MCCoRMICK, supra note 8, § 52, at 127.
11. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (specific acts admissible to show motive or plan, but not to
prove character).
12.

FED. R. EVID. 105.

13.
14.
15.

Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956).
See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 58, at 150 n.12.
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The Advisory Committee's view of the jury's competence to disregard
inadmissible evidence is somewhat ambiguous. In promulgating Rule 105,
the Committee manifested a faith that a jury can disregard evidence for certain
purposes. However, the Committee adds in a note that the rule repels "any
implication that limiting or curative instructions are sufficient in all
situations."' 6 Further doubt' about the jury's ability to follow instructions is
apparent in the Committee's requirement that the "effectiveness" of a Rule
105 instruction be a factor in the court's balancing test for admissibility under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.17
The Supreme Court's faith in the jury's ability to disregard improper
evidence is similarly tempered. While the Court holds to a "general rule that
jury instructions suffice to exclude improper testimony,"' 8 it has also held, in
United States v. Bruton, that "there are some contexts in which the risk that the
jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences
of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of
the jury system cannot be ignored."' l9 The Bruton exception to the Court's
general trust in the jury has thus far been held narrowly to the Bruton fact
situation.2 0 The majority in United States v. Richardson stated the strong but
less-than-idealistic rationale behind the Court's policy concerning juries and
instructions (at least in criminal trials):
The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one,
rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that
it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the

defendant in the criminal justice process. 2

The Court's policy stems more from a balancing of interests than from a belief
in the jury's ability to understand and follow instructions. Thus, while the
Court is more than willing to act upon the presumption thatjury members can
disregard certain evidence, it is unwilling to profess an outright faith in their
competence to do so. The next section will examine the validity of these
reservations by analyzing social science findings concerning the jury's
cognitive ability to disregard evidence.

16. FED. R. EVID. 105 advisory committee's note.
17. Id.
18. Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191 (1987).
19. United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (limiting instruction held insufficient
where non-testifying codefendant's confession names defendant, against whom confession is

inadmissible, in joined trial).
20. See Richardson v.Marsh, 481 U.S.200 (1987) (limiting instruction held sufficient where nontestifying codefendant's confession does not expressly implicate defendant). But cf. Cruz, 481 U.S. at
192 (instruction per se ineffective if codefendant's confession "interlocks" with defendant's own
confession).
21. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211.
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III
SOCIAL SCIENCE FINDINGS AND THE JURY'S COGNITIVE ABILITY TO
DISREGARD

The various positions in the social science community with respect to the

jury's ability to disregard evidence, like the views of the Advisory Committee
and the Supreme Court, are characterized neither by blind faith nor by
absolute pessimism. Rather than baldly asserting that the jury can or cannot
follow instructions, several social scientists have attempted to look behind
jury decisions to learn the cognitive factors that affect the jury's ability in this

area. Numerous experiments have been conducted to study this aspect ofjury
performance. While each one suggests interesting cognitive theories that may
underlie jury behavior, it is important to evaluate the validity of this research.
In the end, no one theory can adequately explain the jury's behavior in
following such instructions. While theories from cognitive psychology no
doubt play a role, they are probably supplemented by other, more practical,
considerations as factors determining the jury's ability or willingness to
disregard or limit the use of evidence.
A.

The Effects of Repetition and Memory

The Chicago Jury Project conducted the first major research concerning
the jury's ability to follow instructions to disregard. 2 2 Dale Broeder, who
participated in the development of the study, reported that when mock jurors
were not informed about a defendant's insurance in a tort case (where the
defendant's liability was clear), they awarded an average of $33,000. In
another condition, where the jurors learned that the defendant was insured,
the average award was $37,000. In the final condition, where jurors were
instructed to disregard the fact of coverage, they actually awarded an even
greater amount-$46,000. 23 Broeder suggested that once the jury learned of
the defendant's insurance coverage, the instruction to disregard only
reminded them of the fact. Moreover, the "fuss" that was made in objecting
to the evidence and in ruling on its admissibility seemed to indicate to jurors
that the insurance had a particular importance, and their attention was further

drawn to

it.24

Research in the area of memory and information processing has tended to

support this explanation. Repetition and perceived salience are certainly
factors that impress data into memory. 25 In addition, some researchers, most
notably Jonathan Casper, have suggested that once a juror hears a fact, it is

almost impossible for him to ignore its effects because that fact colors the
22. See Broeder, The University of ChicagoJury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959).
23. Id. at 754.
24. Id. Interestingly, the taped deliberations in this study revealed that the admonition to
disregard insurance kept jurors from discussing the issue. Nevertheless, the amount of the damage
awards indicated that insurance played a role in juror decisionmaking despite silence on the topic
during deliberation.
25. See, e.g., G. Lo-rus & E. LoFrus, HUMAN MEMORY 7-10, 107-18 (1976).
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juror's thinking of the case as a whole. 2 6 This so-called "hindsight bias"
"appears to involve an integration of outcome information [or, presumably,
inadmissible evidence] into one's understanding of the story, which influences
one's judgments about the inevitability of the outcome one has been told,
perhaps by affecting recall of material or its weighting." 2 7 Thus, the more
inferences that spring from a given piece of evidence, the more difficult it will
be to negate the effect of that evidence by means of a simple instruction to
disregard. Indeed, it is often the very impressive, salient, inferencegenerating potential of a particular type of evidence that moves the Advisory
Committee to label it as inadmissible per se. 28 Loftus, Broeder, and, to some
degree, Casper theorize that when this information is repeated at trial, its
potential relevance only impresses itself further upon the jurors' minds.
This line of thought is consistent with a number of American, British, and
Canadian studies finding jurors unable to use evidence for limited purposes.
In both the United States and Canada, evidence of a defendant's prior
criminal record may be admissible to impeach the defendant but not to prove
that the defendant has a criminal propensity. 2 9 Studies in both countries have
revealed that jurors do not limit their consideration of prior records to the
issue of credibility, however. 30 These studies suggest that once ajury hears of
a defendant's past criminal record, it forms conceptions of the evidence
and/or the defendant that influence the verdict, and mere instuctions to limit
the use of the prior record will not erase those conceptions from the jurors'
memories. 3 ' Thus, according to these studies, limiting instructions probably
have little effect on trial outcomes because it is all but impossible for jurors to
forget evidence for one purpose while remembering it for another.
Any theory of jury competence based primarily on memory suffers from
certain limitations, however. It is somewhat simplistic to assume that a jury
26. J. Casper, Juror Decision-Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias (paper presented at Law
& Society Annual Meeting 1987); Saunders, Vidmar, and Hewitt noticed a similar effect operating
among mock jurors presented with eyewitness testimony. The researchers found that such testimony
may have a continuing effect upon juror evaluations of other evidence and testimony in the trial, even
after the eyewitness has been discredited. Saunders, Vidmar & Hewitt, Eyewitness Testimony and the
DiscreditingEffect, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 57, 70 (S. Lloyd-Bostock & B. Clifford eds. 1983).
27. J. Casper, supra note 26, at 4. For a more detailed discussion of the "story" model of
evidence evaluation, see generally Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision
Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 242 (1986).
28. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee's note (offers to pay medical expenses
inadmissible because this evidence could easily be interpreted as an admission of liability by a party
who may only intend the offer as a humanitarian gesture).
29. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b); FED. R. EVID. 609; Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. ch. E-10, § 12
(1970).
30. See generally Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada
Evidence Act upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L. Q 88 (1972); Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence
Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L. Q 235 (1975); Tanford & Cox, The Effects of
Impeachment Evidence and Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 477 (1988); Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior
Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1986). But see Cornish & SealyJuries
and the Rules of Evidence, 16 CRiM. L. Q 208, 217 (1973) (mock jurors able to take account of an
instruction to disregard similar convictions as evidence of criminal propensity).
31. See Doob & Kirshenbaum. supra note 30, at 95; Hans & Doob, supra note 30, at 251-52;
Tanford & Cox, supra note 30, at 488; Wissler & Saks, supra note 30, at 44.
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will apply all of the evidence it can recall, regardless of any instruction or
circumstance. Research somewhat contradictory to a strict memory theory
comes from Cox and Tanford, who note that instructions to disregard were
more readily followed than instructions to use evidence for limited
purposes. 3 2 Similarly, Saunders, Vidmar, and Hewitt found that mock jurors
were able in some instances to minimize the impact of testimonial evidence
from witnesses who had been discredited. 33 These results indicate that the
process of juror decisionmaking is somewhat more complex than originally
contemplated by Broeder. Jurors may not necessarily act on any piece of
evidence they remember; while memory of evidence is important, it is not the
only factor. Other factors may include the clarity and tone of the instruction,
the juror's understanding of the permitted scope of the evidence, and the
juror's agreement with the policy behind the instruction. Since Broeder's
study did not examine these other factors, it would be unwise to leap to
conclusions of total jury incompetence for this task based on the results of the
Chicago Jury Project and of similar studies.
B.

Reactance Theory

Wolf and Montgomery3 4 found that the degree of insistence in the judge's
instruction to the jury had an effect on the jury's compliance with the
instruction: The more insistent the tone, the less likely the jury would be to
follow the instruction to disregard. 3 5 The two researchers attributed this
36
result to reactance theory.
Reactance theory proposes that when an individual is deprived of the
freedom to choose an option, that forbidden option becomes more attractive
than it had originally appeared. 37 Where the threatened option is seen as an
important one, the result can be noncompliance with the threatening
instruction, or a "boomerang effect," as was apparent in the Broeder study,
where-an admonition to disregard a defendant's insurance coverage actually
38
resulted in increased awards.
Like theories based in memory, theories based upon the reactance effect
do not adequately explain jury performance. The applicability of a reactance
theory to jury behavior in disregarding evidence depends upon the ways in
which the jury views its role in the trial and whether jurors believe that the
32. M. Cox & S. Tanford, Evidence and Instructions in Civil Trials 34 (unpublished manuscript).
33. Saunders, Vidmar & Hewitt, supra note 26, at 68. The researchers suggested that judicial
instructions could further improve jury performance in this area. Id. at 76.
34. Wolf & Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to
Disregardon theJudgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 205, 213 (1977). Sue, Smith,
and Caldwell noted a similar tension between judge and jury in their study of conflict theory, to be
discussed later. See generally Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of
Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 345 (1973).
35. Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 34, at 217-18.
36. J. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 35 (1981).
37. Id. at 96.
38. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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judge is invading their decisionmaking territory. 39 While the reactance factor
may come into play where the inadmissible evidence is particularly attractive
to jurors, or where the judge's manner is particularly unattractive, it is
doubtful that the average juror thinks in such grandiose terms about his role
as to be offended by ajudge merely offering instructions. In fact, since jurors
find themselves in an unfamiliar setting in the courtroom and may be
confused by trial proceedings, it seems more probable that they would
welcome ajudge's instructions as helpful guidelines. 40 True, some jurors may
be wary of a counterintuitive instruction to disregard apparently relevant
evidence and may fear that in following such an instruction they could be
"letting someone off on a technicality." However, where the policy
underlying the exclusionary rule is explained to the jury, and where jurors are
made to understand the legal task before them, such fears can be minimized,
and the degree of reactance may drop considerably. Thus, while reactance
may enter into jury decisionmaking to some extent in certain trial situations, it
iscertainly not the only factor that determines the jury's ability to follow
instructions to limit or disregard evidence.
C.

Conflict Theory

Research by Sue, Smith, and Caldwell 4 1 supported earlier studies finding
mock jurors unable or unwilling to follow instructions to disregard, especially
where there was little admissible evidence available upon which to base a
judgment. These researchers noted that jurors instructed to ignore
apparently convincing evidence were placed in a "moral dilemma," and that
they experienced significant conflict when faced with two undesirable options:
42
ignoring the judge's charge, or reaching an apparently unjust verdict.
These findings suggest that this conflict may be responsible at least in part for
undesirable results reached by juries charged to disregard evidence.
Conflict has long been studied as a psychological phenomenon inherent in
the decisionmaking process. 43 Reactions to conflict may include frustration,
anger, withdrawal, and deterioration of performance. 4 4 Confirmation of
conflict as a substantial factor behind poor jury performance comes from
studies reported by Park and Borgida and Simon in which mock jurors
39. For a discussion of the jury's ability to act outside of the law, see Kadish & Kadish, The
Institutionalization of Conflict: Jury Acquittals, 27 J. Soc. ISSUES 199 (1971). See also Scott, Jury
Nullification:An HistoricalPerspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389 (1988) (arguing against
a jury's right to nullification).
40. See Kassim & Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instruction, and Mock Jury Verdicts, II J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 489, 497-98 (1981)

(elaborately instructed jurors show no "boomerang

effect").
41. Sue, Smith & Caldwell, supra note 34.
42. Id. at 345.
43. See, e.g., L. FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION AND DISSONANCE (1964); I. JANIS & L. MANN,
DECISION MAKING 45-80 (1977).

44.

L.

FESTINGER,

supra note 43, at 3.
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understood why information was supposed to be disregarded, agreed with that
5
policy (and thus experienced less conflict), and performed better. 4
The conflict theory may also underlie results from the studies of past
criminal record evidence discussed earlier. 46 Jurors in those studies may not
have understood the reasoning behind an instruction not to take a
defendant's prior record as evidence of his criminal propensity, and may have
experienced a general confusion as to the task before them. This confusion
may have led to the jurors' inability to follow the limiting instructions given
them.47

However, the above experiments, like all jury simulations, cannot be
trusted absolutely because there are inevitable questions as to their
applicability to the real world. Mock jurors in both the Park and Borgida and
the Simon studies were college students-people who may possess views and
abilities different from those of the general public. In addition, these mock
jurors knew that the situations presented to them were hypothetical and they
were therefore perhaps less likely to treat their task with the level of gravity
that a real juror would maintain in a real case. 48 Similarly, the mock jurors in
the prior criminal record studies, while more representative of the general
public than groups of college students, were also aware of the hypothetical
nature of the problems presented to them.
Nevertheless, the conflict theory suggested by these experiments is a
commonsense explanation of poor jury performance in disregarding evidence
and is supported as a general human tendency in other areas. It is only logical
that conflicting undesirable options generate confusion in jurors' minds,

which in turn may generate inconsistent or flawed jury decisions. This theory
leaves little room for improvement of the system, however. If stress,
withdrawal, and poor performance are inevitable reactions to conflict, how are
we to avoid the conflict that engenders these reactions? Conflict may be
reduced only when jurors happen to know, understand, and agree with the
policy behind the evidentiary exclusion. Would an explanation of such policy
only reinforce the inadmissible facts in jurors' minds, as was suggested by
some studies above? More disturbingly, the conflict theory posits cognitive
dissonance as an all but inevitable result of limited-option decisions. 4 9 If
jurors always experience a degree of cognitive dissonance (akin to regret)
45. See Park & Borgida, The Entrapment Defense: Juror Comprehension and Decision Making, 12 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 19, 32 (1988) (mock jurors whose "intuitive view" was that prior conviction evidence
should not be used against defendants were able to disregard such evidence upon instruction);
Simon, Murder,Juries, and the Press, 3 TRANSACTION 40 (1966) (mock jurors, apparently viewing news
reports as sensational and irrelevant, able to disregard them upon instruction).
46. See Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 30; Hans & Doob, supra note 30; Tanford & Cox, supra
note 30; Wissler & Saks, supra note 30.
47. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 30, at 44 (mock jurors, apparently confused as to their
task, admitted to using criminal record evidence to assess guilt even after having been instructed not
to do so).
48. For further discussion of these and other limitations ofjury simulations, see Vidmar, Effects of
Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 211, 216 (1972).
49. L. FESTINGER, supra note 43, at 5.
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after making their decisions, there are disturbing implications concerning the
public's level of satisfaction with the judicial system to consider.
D.

Other Theories and Suggestions from Social Scientists

Among the most important factors not contemplated in the above
experiments is the jury's ability to comprehend instructions. 50 Indeed,
significant improvements in jury performance could result from more clearly
worded instructions. 5' Poor jury performance in some cases may result
simply from the jurors' inability to understand the judge's description of their
task. 52 Others have recommended instructing the jury of their implicit right
to go outside the law in making their decisions. 5 3 While this move would
certainly minimize juror conflict, it would probably have a profound and
negative impact upon the stability and predictability of the law. 54 Finally,
perhaps the most creative response to this issue offered by social science has
been the suggestion of videotaping testimony and then showing it (with
inadmissible evidence edited out) to the jury. 55 Whether the courts will ever
adopt such an elaborate and untraditional scheme is doubtful.
The research surveyed above has identified the following factors as having
at least some impact upon the jury's ability to follow instructions to disregard
evidence or to use it for limited purposes:
1. Repetition of the inadmissible evidence at trial.
2. Perceived salience of the evidence.
3. Style and level of insistence of the judge in delivering the
instruction to disregard.
4. Jurors' perceptions of an invasion by the judge of their role in
the decision process.
5. Jurors' understanding of and agreement with policies underlying
exclusionary rules.
6. Jurors' comprehension of language used in instructions.
50. See Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable. A Psycholinguistic Study ofJury
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Sales, Elwork & Alfini, Improving Comprehensionfor Jury
Instructions, in PERSPECTIVES IN LAW & PSYCHOLOGY 23 (B. Sales ed. 1977); Severance & Loftus,
Improving the Ability ofJurors to Comprehend and Apply CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc'y REV. 153
(1982).
51. See Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 50, at 27. For examples of rewritten instructions, see
Charrow & Charrow, supra note 50, at 1341-58; Severance & Loftus, supra note 50, at 185-88.
52. See, e.g., Hans & Brooks, Effect of CorroborationInstructions in a Rape Case on ExperimentalJuries,
15 OsGooDE HALL L.J. 701, 715 (1978) (mock jurors may have been unable to understand
corroboration instructions); Wissler & Saks, supra note 30, at 44 (mock jurors, apparently unaware of
the meaning of their instructions, admit to using prior conviction evidence to assess guilt even
though they had been instructed not to do so).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
54. See Scott, supra note 39, at 422.
55. See Sue, Smith & Caldwell, supra note 34, at 353 (discussing experiment of H.E. Mitchell & D.
Byrne).
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The following section will identify how these factors may apply in a concrete
setting: thejury's application of Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the rape shield
statute.
IV
APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE FINDINGS TO A CONCRETE
EVIDENTIARY POLICY ISSUE: THE RAPE SHIELD STATUTE

A.

The Mechanics of Federal Rule of Evidence 412

Among the Federal Rules of Evidence that describe situations in which
specific types of evidence become per se inadmissible is Federal Rule 412, the
so-called rape shield statute. This rule limits the introduction of past sexual
history of a rape victim to instances for which admission is constitutionally
required (Rule 412(b)(1)), 56 instances of sexual behavior with third parties
used only to identify the source of blood or semen (Rule 412(b)(2)(A)), and
instances of sexual behavior with the accused used to provide evidence on the
issue of consent (Rule 412(b)(2)(B)).
The rationale behind the rule is both to "protect a woman from the
wholesale exposure of her sexual past" 5 7 and to reflect an enlightened social

policy in which evidence of consent to sex in the past will not be taken as
probative of consent on a given occasion. 58 Indeed, before the reform of
exclusionary rules in rape cases, rape trials would often turn into full-scale
investigations of the victim's character and private life, which by and large
ignored the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence as to the specific crime
charged. 59 Some critics, arguing that exclusion of sexual history in rape cases
should be absolute or nearly. so, contend that even after the passage of
Federal Rule 412 and similar state legislation, 60 the courts are still trying the
victim and not the accused. 6 ' Opponents of an absolute exclusionary rule in
these cases cite the constitutional right of a defendant to a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence in his defense, and the difficulty of proving
consent without some reference to the victim's sexual past. 62 From a policy
standpoint, Rule 412, with its undefined exception for "constitutionally
required" evidence and its general ban on the admission of instances of
sexual conduct with third parties, represents an acceptable if vaguely
56. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
544 (1980).
57. S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 57 (1987).
58. See Borgida, Legal Reform of Rape Laws, in 2 APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY ANN. 211, 212 (L.
Bickman ed. 1981).
59. See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 56, at 546-51.
60.

For a state-by-state analysis of evidentiary rape statutes, see H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS
A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 207-458 (1980).
61. See id. at 173-80; S. ESTRICH, supra note 57, at 88 (despite reformed evidentiary laws, defense
attorneys report that they still investigate the victim's sexual history and "seek ways to use the
AND RAPE:

information to discredit the victim").
62. See, e.g., Berger, Man's Tial, Woman's Tribulation. Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 98-99 (1977).
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articulated compromise between these two camps. However, even if Rule 412
represents a workable policy with respect to rape cases, one must examine the
jury's ability to deal with the rule before pronouncing it valid.
B.

Cognitive Skills Required of Jurors by Federal Rule of Evidence 412

For Rule 412 to be applied effectively at trial, the jurors involved must
possess certain cognitive abilities. If prior sexual history evidence finds its
way before a jury, that jury must be able to use it in a very precise and limited
manner, as described above. Some researchers have questioned the jury's
ability to follow Rule 412's guidelines. 6 3 For example, under the rule, prior
sexual history may not be used to make assumptions about the victim's
character. This restriction is a difficult one to follow; studies have shown that
jurors tend to view the victim's character as an important factor in rape
decisions. 6 4 The situation becomes even more difficult if sexual history
evidence is admitted at trial for a purpose permissible under Rule 412, such as
to prove consent, but the jury is instructed not to consider the evidence as it
may bear on the victim's character. Now the jury is faced with the cognitively
complex task of using evidence for limited purposes-a job which may well be
65
more intellectually challenging than disregarding evidence in its entirety.
Even when jurors are instructed to disregard evidence completely under
Rule 412-as when the source of semen is not in issue and evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct with third parties mistakenly gets before a jury-the
situtation is problematic. One source of difficulty is thak this type of evidence
tends to linger in the mind-in accordance with some memory theories
discussed above-due to its emotional nature and perceived salience. 6 6 In
63. See, e.g., H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 60, at 173.
64. Borgida & White, Social Perception of Rape Victims: The Impact of Legal Reform, 2 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 339 (1978); Feild, Rape Trials andJurors"Decisions: A Psycholegal Analysis of the Effects of Victim,
Defendant, and Case Characteristics,3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (1979); Landy & Aronson, The Influence of
the Character of the Criminal and His Victim on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 141 (1969). But cf. Reskin & Visher, The Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal Factorsin Jurors'
Decisions, 20 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 423, 431 (1986); Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of
Evidence, II LAW & HUM. BEHIAV. 1, 13 (1987) (both studies noting that while the rape victim's
character may enter into juror deliberations, its importance in decisionmaking is not absolute
because jurors consider many evidentiary factors in addition to such extralegal elements as victim
attributes).
A recent Florida case appears to bear out the theory that victim attributes weigh heavilysometimes decisively-in juror decisionmaking. In October 1989, Steven Lord, the defendant in a
Broward County trial, was acquitted of rape and kidnapping charges because jurors believed that his
victim "asked for it for the way she was dressed." The victim had testified that the defendant had
stolen her car, driven her along a highway, and raped her three times along the roadside at
knifepoint. See McCarty, Jury Blames Woman in Rape Case; Drifter Acquitted in Violent Assault, Miami
Herald, Oct. 5, 1989, at Al, col. 6. (In March 1990, Lord received a fifty-year sentence after a
Georgia jury found him guilty of rape in a separate assault. See Florida Rapist Convicted in Separate
Attack, Washington Times, Apr. 20, 1990, at A7.)
65. See Cox & Tanford, supra note 32 (mock jurors better able to follow instructions to disregard
evidence completely than instructions to use evidence for limited purposes).
66. Borgida, Evidentiary Reform of Rape Laws: 4 Psycholegal Approach, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH 171, 178 (P. Lipsitt & B. Sales eds. 1980). See also G. Loi'rus & E. Lorrus,
supra note 25, at 107-18.
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addition, a hindsight bias 67 may be created by such evidence, causing jurors to
view the acts of the defendant in light of their impressions of the victim's
character. All of these factors combine to make the disregarding of sexual
history in accordance with Rule 412 a challenging task for any jury.
Adding to the jury's difficulties with Rule 412 is the fact that individual
jury members may not agree with the social policy behind the rule. Some
jurors may still believe that a woman who has consented to sex with others in
the past probably consented to sex with the defendant on the given occasion.
Worse still, some jurors may assume that a woman's perceived promiscuity
has a direct bearing on the gravity of the defendant's conduct in a rape case,
and may refuse to punish the accused upon hearing of the victim's prior
sexual experiences. 6 8 Such beliefs may cause jurors to experience a
distressing degree of conflict 69 when they are told to disregard prior sexual
history evidence. Such conflict, in turn, may well cause jurors to ignore their
instructions and override the strictures of Rule 412. Of course, if jurors
comprehend and agree with the policy behind the exclusionary instruction,
70
the problem of conflict can be minimized.
Finally, in reviewing the difficulties that the federal rape shield statute
presents to juries, it is worth noting that as one of the longest and most
complex of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 412 will no doubt generate
7
some rather linguistically difficult jury instructions. '
C.

Policy Recommendations

Jurors are faced with a complex cognitive task in dealing with Federal Rule
of Evidence 412, and it would be naive to assume that juries could ever apply
its provisions with consistent and flawless understanding. However,
imperfect jury performance in this area does not excuse a failure on the part
of reformers to investigate possible improvements to the system. Poor jury
performance in this area need not lead to the resigned hopelessness
characteristic of so many litigators and jury specialists. Instead, it should be
an incentive toward reform.
Some reformers have suggested the implementation of a stricter or even
absolute exclusionary rule regarding prior sexual history. 72 While such a rule
would simplify the jury's job considerably, the promulgation of such a
measure would collide impermissibly with the constitutional rights of
73
defendants.
67.
68.

See generally J. Casper, supra note 26.
See S. ESTRICH, supra note 57, at 49.
69. See L. FESTINGER, supra note 43; I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 43.
70. See Kassim & Wrightsman, supra note 40 (elaborate instruction able to convey policy behind
evidentiary rule to jurors); Park & Borgida, supra note 45.
71. For discussions of the effects of linguistic difficulty on comprehension ofjury instructions, see
generally Charrow & Charrow, supra note 50; Sales, Elwork & Alfini, supra note 50.

72.
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See, e.g., Borgida, supra note 66, at 192; Feild, supra note 64, at 279.
See generally Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 56.
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A better solution may be to give jurors supplementary or additional
instructions explaining the policy behind the rule. Of course, these
instructions, like the limiting instructions themselves, should be as clearly
worded and comprehensible as possible. Such an explanation would
eliminate some of the conflict experienced by jurors faced with the job of
deciding rape cases while disregarding certain pieces of evidence. Armed
with an understanding of why certain evidence should not be considered,
jurors will be less likely to experience conflict and less likely to view their
options as limited. In addition, an explanation of underlying policy would
eliminate most feelings of reactance or resentment toward the judicial system
because jurors would view the procedures to be followed as less arbitrary and
more reasonable. Of course, there is always the risk that a long explanation
will focus too much attention upon the inadmissible evidence itself, but if the
explanation results in a heightened awareness of the dangers of using such
evidence, this risk may not pose a significant problem. Indeed, as societal
views regarding sexual mores develop, coming more into line with the policies
behind Rule 412, the option of explanatory instructions will become even less
risky and more attractive.
V
CONCLUSION

While juries obviously have problems with the difficult task of disregarding
evidence, social science findings may be helpful both in discovering the
sources of these problems and in developing recommendations for their
alleviation. The courts and the Advisory Committee are correct in continuing
to promulgate exclusionary rules and to provide limiting instructions on the
assumption that juries will follow them. To do otherwise would be to ignore
the potential for improving both instructions and jury performance. While
individual jurors may sometimes disagree with the rationales underlying
exclusionary rules, and this disagreement may lead to a flawed execution of
the jury's task-as in the rape shield situation-there is no reason to abandon
the use of limiting instructions, provided they reflect a valid policy. Finally, if
judges are aware of the findings of social science in this area, and are willing
to experiment, they may devise instructions and procedures more attuned to
the jury's true cognitive abilities. Such changes could continually narrow the
gap between ideal legal policy and actual jury performance.
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